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- Hello, I’m looking for the room for making love.
- Oh, right. You must mean the Honeymoon Suite. Well, that’s
straight that way, can’t miss it.
- I know where it is. I just wanted you to know that I know
where I’m going, so you needn’t bother with me.
“The Missing Ingredient”
First part of the movie “Four Rooms” (1995)
Abstract. Our main aim is to raise awareness of higher-order
knowledge, i.e. knowledge about knowledge, as an issue in simulat-
ing realistic non-player characters in computer games. We motivate
the importance of higher-order knowledge with arguments, as well as
a few examples. We survey existing games and literature to show that
this issue is currently neglected. We also refer to our earlier work to
illustrate one approach to simulating higher-order reasoning, which
we call “explicit knowledge programming”. Finally we describe a
number of issues which arise when carrying out such an implemen-
tation, some of which go beyond the scope of the present motivation
of computer gaming, and are of more general interest.
1 Introduction
If you ask people why they do things, they often give you reasons in
terms of knowledge and beliefs.2 The answer to the question, “Why
did the chicken cross the road?”, i.e., “To get to the other side”, does
not tell the whole story: if we were to attribute human agency to our
feathered agent, then a complete answer would be couched in terms
of her beliefs and desires. Because we are social animals, these rea-
sons sometimes will involve several agents. In order to reason about
interactive behaviour amongst such groups of agents, we have re-
course to higher-order beliefs (which are beliefs about beliefs). For
example, if Ann knows that Bob knows that the party starts at 8, then
she usually won’t tell him, unless she wants to make sure that he
knows that she knows it. Indeed, how could one reason about such
a situation without talking about higher-order beliefs? Even if Paul
Churchland were correct, and one’s talk of beliefs were unscientific
nonsense, still it is pervasive and has some explanatory force. If peo-
ple engage, consciously or unconsciously, in reasoning about beliefs,
then a natural way to simulate some aspects of human behavour, par-
ticularly those aspects involving interaction, is to engage in reasoning
about beliefs.
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2 We view “belief” as a more general notion than “knowledge”: knowing
something implies believing it. Concepts are defined in analogous ways
for belief and knowledge, and we will use “epistemic” to mean “of/about
beliefs/knowledge”. In the more technical parts we will for simplicity focus
on knowledge.
An important goal of interactive fiction (IF) games or, more gener-
ally, computer role playing games (RPGs) is to simulate convincingly
social situations within a virtual world. We believe that to this end
epistemic reasoning is crucial. It would therefore be natural for a pro-
grammer to be able to describe the behaviour of computer-simulated,
non-player characters (NPCs) using rules that contain explicit knowl-
edge statements, including higher-order ones. However, as we will
see in Section 2, in current computer games this epistemic aspect is
surprisingly overlooked.3 To strengthen our argument, in Section 3
we will give some scenarios, involving higher-order epistemic rea-
soning, that we find plausible to occur in RPGs.
In [28] we described an approach for providing knowledge state-
ments on the level of a programming language, and for proving that
such statements are evaluated faithfully with respect to a formal def-
inition of knowledge. That approach is modular in the sense that
all aspects of epistemic modeling can be implemented in a dedi-
cated knowledge module. In the context of computer games, an NPC
scripter could thus use high-level tools and would be alleviated from
having to keep track of these things explicitly and manually. We will
briefly describe that approach, which uses ideas from epistemic logic,
in Section 4.
We will conclude by raising some open issues in Section 5. These
are concerned with making the knowledge module tractably imple-
mentable by restricting the possible inputs and queries. The basic
questions are:
• What kinds of events should be used as inputs to change the state
of the module, and how to formalize them? Even a simple event,
like the player picking up an object, may have an effect on some
agents’ (higher-order) knowledge. These effects will depend on
subtleties of the wider situation.
• What kinds of queries to the module are relevant? Not all theoreti-
cally possible knowledge statements will occur or even be realistic
to compute. Since the goal is to simulate real-life social interac-
tion, to answer this question one has to look at human higher-order
reasoning.
2 State of the Art
We will briefly review the current state of the art with respect to
epistemic modeling in computer games, both in the “real world” and
in (academic) research.
2.1 Real World
The state of the art in commercial computer games is not easy to
judge, since computer game companies are not very keen on publish-
3 When we refer to “computer games” in this paper, we have games like RPGs
and IF in mind. For other games, like poker, epistemic aspects have indeed
been considered.
ing the details of their AI implementations. So if one doesn’t want to
rely on the enthusiastic slogans from marketing departments, then
the best sources of information about computer game AI are private
web pages like [29] where observations and analyses from playing,
interview quotations, and possibly the website creator’s own knowl-
edge and experience as AI programmer are carefully collected and
presented. For an extensive list of online resources, see [23].
From these resources it becomes evident that epistemic reasoning
is definitely not in the focus of existing computer game AI, and we
did not find any mention of higher-order reasoning. For example, the
highly acclaimed Radiant AI engine is used in the RPG The Elder
Scrolls: OblivionTM [6] to make the game more lifelike. The follow-
ing quotation from an interview [5] during the testing phase of the
game AI illustrates its functioning:
One [non-player] character was given [by the testers] a rake and
the goal ”rake leaves”; another was given a broom and the goal
”sweep paths,” and this worked smoothly. Then they swapped
the items, so that the raker was given a broom and the sweeper
was given the rake. In the end, one of them killed the other so
he could get the proper item.
Obviously, the characters didn’t mutually know their interests, or
they couldn’t make use of that knowledge.
To us it seems natural that one would use a logic-based approach
in order to effectuate epistemic reasoning. Indeed, a logic-based for-
malism is an important part of what we will suggest in Section 4.
References in these directions are scarce. In [18], it is suggested
to use logic for NPC scripting; however, higher-order epistemic rea-
soning is not considered, and the article seems to have been left at a
brainstorming stage and not followed up on. The clearest statement
promoting the use of epistemic reasoning comes from the famous IF
writer Emily Short [25]:
Abstract Knowledge.One of the artificial abilities we might like
to give our NPCs, aside from the ability to wander around a
map intelligently and carry out complex goals, is the ability
to understand what they are told: to keep track of what items
of knowledge they have so far, use them to change their plans
and goals, and even draw logical inferences from what they’ve
learned.
It is not clear whether this refers to higher-order knowledge, or
whether “abstract” just is meant to imply that the implementation
should be generic and encapsulated in a knowledge module; in any
case, the currently existing IF implementation of such ideas [11] is
restricted to pure facts and does not include any reference to the pos-
sibility of higher-order knowledge.
2.2 Research
Computer game AI is slowly becoming accepted as an area for se-
rious academical research [15, 13]. In recent years, conferences and
other scientific meetings on the interface of artificial intelligence and
computer games have emerged [24, 4, 17] and special issues of mag-
azines have appeared [1, 2, 3].
Again, where knowledge is considered, the concern seems to be
exclusively domain knowledge, or knowledge about facts in the game
world, as in [22, 26]. A more general approach of using agent pro-
gramming languages to script NPCs (e.g. [16]) inherits the epistemic
reasoning facilities of such languages – which tend to focus on facts.
The closest in spirit to higher-order modeling are attempts to detect
the general attitude of the human player (for example, aggressive or
cautious) and to adjust the game AI accordingly. But we could find
no references to explicit higher-order epistemic modeling.
The ScriptEase system [8] is an academic approach to NPC script-
ing, which was motivated by the insight that the scripting process
needs to be simplified. It provides a graphical interface for generating
behaviours of characters in a commercial RPG. However, knowledge
statements to steer the behaviour are not considered.
A very interesting approach, described in [9], uses deontic logic to
specify NPC behaviour in a rule-based fashion. While epistemic is-
sues are not considered there, a fusion of these two aspects could pro-
vide a highly suitable system for scripting believable social agents.
Some literature on higher-order reasoning in multi-agent systems
that does not focus on computer games is also very relevant. In [10],
the specific problem of agent communication is studied, in which
agents weigh costs against expected benefit of communication. The
authors point out the importance of using higher-order reasoning,
in the form of beliefs about beliefs, when agents make such assess-
ments. Their particular interest is in formal representation of belief
“abduction”. We do not consider abductive reasoning here, but we
recognise that it is also important in our settings.
We also note that higher-order reasoning is discussed in [30] in the
context of a Petri Net method for designing “intelligent team training
systems”. The authors suggest that using Petri Nets can help to over-
come tractability issues in epistemic reasoning. However, they note
that communication, an important ingredient in the kind of social in-
teraction we wish to simulate, “is more complicated than Petri Nets
can represent”. We do not consider the Petri Net formalism further,
but if progress is made in this area it could be of relevance.
3 Scenarios and Examples
Having seen that higher-order epistemic reasoning is not currently
considered in the context we are interested in, we will now describe
a few small scenarios of social interaction naturally involving this
kind of reasoning. We believe that by simulating the aspects of the
real world that are highlighted by these examples, computer game
worlds will become more convincing.
Scenario 1. If Ann is (openly) present when Carl tells Bob about
some fact, then she won’t tell the same fact to Bob again a minute
later. Indeed, doing so under usual circumstances would be puzzling
and inexplicable behaviour.
Scenario 2. If Ann gets an advantage from lying to Bob, and knows
that he doesn’t know the truth then she might indeed lie; if she knows
he does know then she usually won’t; if she doesn’t know whether
he knows then her decision may depend on other circumstances.
Scenario 3. Part of being a doctor is the obligation to help people
around you whom you know to be sick.4 Imagine Ann is a doctor
who unfortunately would profit of getting rid of Bob. Not only will
she take care that no-one sees her putting the poison into his glass,
she will also make sure (e.g. by immediately going on holidays) that
no-one knows that she knows that Bob is dying, because otherwise
not saving him would make her suspicious.
The simple rule of pragmatics in Scenario 1 (that things which are
commonly known5 aren’t usually worth stating) makes essential use
4 This scenario is inspired by a discussion from [20].
5 Something is common knowledge among a group of agents if all agents
know it, know that they all know it, and so on ad infinitum.
of epistemic reasoning. Moreover, whatever character type Ann in
Scenario 2 is supposed to have, implementing it should be facilitated
by epistemic operators. The last scenario may seem a bit contrived,
but on the other hand it is very common for game characters to have
professions, and in a world of intrigue and adventure having to get
rid of someone is also quite conceivable. It manifestly also involves
epistemic reasoning.
The variety and generality of these scenarios illustrates how ap-
plicable the underlying ideas are in many different situations which
could occur in IF or RPGs.
4 Making Knowledge Explicit
If more attention should be paid to epistemic reasoning in simulating
human interaction in IF and RPGs, a natural question is: how should
this be done? In this section we propose an approach for tackling
the problem of programming a simulation of higher-order epistemic
reasoning.
The approach is based around epistemic logic.6 That is, we pro-
pose using some formal language in which epistemic statements
can be formulated and evaluated. The formulae of such a language
might for example be built recursively from “atoms”, which are non-
epistemic facts, by using propositional connectives, like ∨ (or) and
¬ (not), and knowledge operators Ka, one for each agent a being
simulated. We will call these “epistemic formulae”. So for example
if p were an atom, then KaKbp could be an epistemic formula with
the intended reading “a knows that b knows that p”.
In [28], we described a simple and preliminary implementation
to provide statements involving explicit knowledge formulae on the
programming language level, and proved the implementation to be
sound with respect to a formal notion of knowledge defined on the
level of the underlying process calculus. We took a modular ap-
proach, writing a knowledge module that is instantiated for each pro-
cess. We will briefly review this work in the following.
In our particular implementation, the events that were used as in-
puts to the knowledge module were always synchronous communi-
cations between two of the processes concerning the values of some
bits. In general though, an event can be anything which would have
epistemic effects. The idea is to pass to the knowledge module of a
process a the events that a ‘observes’.
The queries to which the knowledge module can respond
are epistemic formulae. We used a formal language with atoms
px0 ,¬px0 , px1 ,¬px1 , . . . for each of the bits x0, x1, . . ., and a
knowledge operator Ka,Kb, . . . for each of the processes a, b, . . ..7
Then, as an example, the formula KcKb¬px2 means that process c
knows that process b knows that x2 has the value 0. If the knowl-
edge module of process a were passed this formula it could respond
by saying “yes”, “no” or “don’t know”. If the module were to re-
spond “yes”, then this should be interpreted as (the agent which is
modelled by process) a knowing that c knows that a knows that x2
is 0. A programmer can use such queries, for example, in conditional
statements and thus have the program flow depend on the process’s
knowledge.
Even with a simple implementation, it was desirable to prove that
it was in some sense “correct”. Thus we used a formalism from the
literature on epistemic logic, namely Kripke models. The argument
6 The research field of epistemic logic can be said to have been initiated
with [14].
7 Note that here we are not using the richer language that could be built using
also the connectives ¬ and ∨ mentioned above.
for correctness of the implementation then proceeds in two steps,
which can roughly be stated as follows:
• Argue that a particular modelM represents faithfully the intuitive
situation which we intended to capture.
• Prove that knowledge formulae are evaluated in the same way by
process a after the sequence of events σ as they are by agent a in
the modelM after the same sequence of events.
One criticism that one can make of using a Kripke model formal-
ism as an intermediate step is that that formalism itself can appear
unintuitive. However, we know of no more philosophically grounded
and mathematically robust formalism with which to work in the con-
text of reasoning about higher-order knowledge. (In order to deal
with various phenomena like so-called “explicit belief”, or inconsis-
tent beliefs, many other models have been proposed, but these are
all essentially refinements or variations of Kripke models – see [19,
Sections 2.4 to 2.13] for a selective survey.)
The Kripke model that we specified for the particular implemen-
tation we had in mind resembled an “interpreted system” from [12].
It was not our aim to implement directly an entire interpreted sys-
tem, which in this case is an infinite structure. Even if it is finitely
representable, we might only be interested in certain parts of it.
In general, an implementation can be simplified by considering a
subclass of the formulae that would be in the full logical language
which the model could interpret. As it happened, for the particular
implementation we had in mind (a distributed implementation of an
algorithm for eliminating dominated strategies in strategic games), it
was only necessary to consider formulae from the very simple epis-
temic language that we have described.
In the case of simulating realistic human agents (so in particular
within IF and RPGs), the limits to human cognitive faculties should
be taken into account. So for example, would it make sense to allow
as queries to the knowledge module epistemic formulae involving
complex iterations as in, “Ann believes that Bob believes that Carl
doesn’t believe that Ann believes that Derek believes that it’s rain-
ing”?
5 Open Issues
This brings us to the question of what inputs and queries to the
knowledge module ought to be allowed. The two parts of this ques-
tion are to some extent independent.
The first part concerns the events in the game world that should
affect the knowledge states of the characters. In a way the issue of
what events should be taken into account is up to the designer of
the world. We think it is difficult to make a general statement about
which kinds of events matter and which don’t.
Once the events that the virtual world generates are more or less
decided, we need abstract representations of them and specifications
of their exact conditions and epistemic effects. Again it is difficult to
make general statements, because they depend on the specific event.
For example, if an event consists in the player picking up an object,
the simplest approach would be that it becomes common knowledge
between all present agents that the player possesses that object. But
there is some freedom in the degree of fine-grainedness and detail in
which this event should be represented and processed. Should simply
all agents in a certain radius gain common knowledge, or should it
be taken into account in which direction they are currently looking
and whether everyone is mutually visible?
The second part of the question, which is clearer than the previous
part and which we believe may be answered empirically, concerns
the class of knowledge statements that matter and that the knowl-
edge module should be able to handle. Here again the fact can be
used that the computer games we have in mind want to realistically
model human social interaction. The question, which is also of in-
dependent interest, then becomes: What class of epistemic formulae
are evaluated by humans in everyday life, consciously or not?
Some results from experimental game theory about levels of
strategic thinking [7] can be interpreted as being relevant to this
question. However, these experiments do not focus on everyday so-
cial interaction. For example, the Beauty Contest game mentioned in
the previous reference might invoke conscious and explicit reason-
ing about the other agents, while we believe that, through years of
experience in social interaction, the requisite higher-order reasoning
processes may also occur on a more intuitive and reflexive level.
Furthermore, the experimental designs are in general not specifi-
cally concerned with knowledge, so that at best the results can give us
hints about the nesting depth of knowledge operators. Clearly other
criteria might define the class of knowledge formulae that are of rel-
evance in social interactions.
For example, from Scenario 2 it is clear that formulae like
Ka¬Kbp
KaKbp
¬(KaKbp ∨Ka¬Kbp)
matter. However, that doesn’t necessarily hold for all formulae of
knowledge operator depth 2. Also, human reasoning capabilities may
not be monotonic with respect to this complexity measure. For ex-
ample, for a special concept like common knowledge, which in the-
ory involves infinite depth, we might want to assume that humans
are able to cope with it, while this does not hold for “intermediate”
depths like 10000.
The main issue thus remains: How can we define this class of rel-
evant formulae?
In [27], results from experiments suggest that subjects use first-
order Theory of Mind (beliefs about others’ beliefs), but not “all
kinds of reasoning possible and useful in this context”. This supports
the claim that the depth of knowledge operators is not the only rel-
evant criterion. It is further reported that some subjects use second-
order Theory of Mind, which corresponds to third-order epistemic
formulas.
While it is interesting to look at such questions in experimental
setups, an alternative approach could shed additional light on these
issues, namely to come up with realistic social situations and think
about what kinds of reasoning processes go on. This is basically what
we did in Section 3, and work by Parikh is an excellent source for
enlightening examples (see e.g. [21]). Such thought experiments or
observations from real life can be convincing enough to remove the
need for abstractions and reproducible lab conditions as provided by
experiments, for the benefit of being set in more natural environ-
ments, where human reasoning capabilities possibly profit from ex-
perience and training in specific social situations.
6 Summary
The main aim of this paper was to raise awareness of higher-order
knowledge as an issue in simulating realistic non-player characters
in computer games. Section 2 surveyed existing games and literature
and found that this has not yet been done. Section 3 gave some il-
lustrative and motivating examples of what we mean by higher-order
knowledge, in situations that could plausibly occur in IF and RPGs.
Section 4 gave an example of an implementation of explicit knowl-
edge programming. One suggestion of this paper is that this is a sen-
sible and realistic approach to implementing higher-order knowledge
reasoning, and therefore to simulating some interactive aspects of
human behaviour. Finally, Section 5 described a number of issues
which arise when carrying out such an implementation. We raised
issues which go beyond the scope of the present motivation of IF and
RPGs, and are of general interest.
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